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LEGISLATING SURROGACY: A PARTIAL ANSWER TO
FEMINIST CRITICISM
INTRODUCTION
Although surrogate motherhood has been practiced in some
form since Biblical times,' it was not until the landmark Baby A2 case
that modem surrogacy captured public attention and became the sub-
ject of widespread debate. The intense media scrutiny of such cases,
increased demand for surrogacy,' and ever-improving technology
have forced us to rethink our beliefs about such issues as sex, parent-
ing, the scope of personal freedom, and privacy. They have engen-
.1. In the Bible, for instance, when Sarah, Rachel, and Leah were unable to bear chil-
dren, they gave their handmaids, Hagar, Bilhah, and Zilpah, to have babies for their hus-
bands. GENESIS 16:1-4, 15; 30:1-10. As proponents of surrogacy often fail to point out,
however, this arrangement degenerated into some confusion and turmoil. Shari O'Brien,
Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 127, 133-34 (1986).
"Soon after Hagar became pregnant, she began to despise Sarah, Sarah blamed Abraham,
and Abraham insisted that Sarah handle Hagar. Sarah in turn harshly rebuked Hagar, who
consequently left town." Id. I offer the rest of the story not as proof that surrogacy should
be prohibited, but rather as an illustration of the complexities and potential problems
involved in surrogacy for which legislation can provide a useful remedy.
2. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). In Baby M, Mary Beth Whitehead, a mar-
ried mother of two, agreed to be inseminated with the sperm of William Stem and to give
up the resulting child to him. She was to be paid $10,000. Id. at 1235. Three days after
the baby was born, Mrs. Whitehead turned the child over to Mr. and Mrs. Stem. Id. White-
head then changed her mind, and claimed the baby as her own. Id. at 1236-37. A dis-
turbing sequence of events ensued, including police raids on the Whitehead residence, the
Whiteheads' disappearance while "on the run" with the child for approximately three
months, suicide threats by Mrs. Whitehead, and accusations that Mr. Stem had sexually
abused Whitehead's older daughter. Id. at 1237. Ultimately, the court awarded full cus-
tody of the child to Mr. Stem, and visitation rights to Mrs. Whitehead. Id. at 1278. Mrs.
Stem, the intended mother, who was and is actually responsible for the care and upbring-
ing of the child, received no legal rights whatsoever. For a more detailed discussion of the
background of the case, see Bonnie Steinbock, Surrogate Motherhood as Prenatal Adoption, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLTmCS AND PRIVACy 123-28 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
3. Mark Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations: On Surrogate Reasons and Surrogacy Poli-
cies, 60 TENN. L. Rav. 135 (1992).
It has been estimated that ten to fifteen percent of couples in the Western World
wanting to have children cannot have them. It is not difficult to understand why
some of these couples might be tempted to hire a surrogate, because their op-
tions are somewhat limited. While they might try to adopt, the supply of adopta-
ble children has diminished because of the widespread use of contraceptives, the
liberalization of abortion, and the fading social stigma attached to unwed
mothers.
Id. at 136-37. Janice Raymond reports that "the correct [number of infertile couples in the
United States] is one in twelve." JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBs: REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATrLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM 3 (1993).
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dered a vigorous debate about surrogacy's ethical and legal
implications. "The stakes in the surrogacy debate are high. They are
nothing less than the future of the family, the standards for parenting,
and the societal image of women. "'
The surrogacy debate illustrates the fundamental tension be-
tween autonomy and paternalism.5 Advocates for surrogacy argue
that it is simply another choice that technology has created and that
the state should not dictate how or whether this choice should be ex-
ercised.6 Critics contend that the state should prohibit surrogacy be-
cause it exploits and degrades its participants and society as a whole."
This Comment notes that both sides of the issue are correct. Sur-
rogacy has the potential both to exploit and to liberate women.8 The
Comment concludes that, although critics have valid concerns about
surrogacy and its implications, carefully drafted legislation can mini-
mize the potentially exploitative aspects of surrogacy and protect the
individuals who choose it as a reproductive option. Whether or not
one believes surrogacy is morally acceptable, the improvement and
regulation of the system would be beneficial to potential parties and
society as a whole. Regulation is superior to either the prohibition or
even criminalization of surrogacy, actions which would be of question-
able constitutionality9 and in all likelihood drive surrogacy under-
ground.' ° As Marjorie Shultz stated, "[t]he critical, overarching
4. LoRI B. ANDREws, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS, EXPECrANT FATHERS,
AND BRAVE NEW BAIEs xv (1989).
5. Bonnie Steinbock argues that, although "[a]t one time, the characterization of a
prohibition as paternalistic was a sufficient reason to reject it, [t]he pendulum has now
swung back, and many people are willing to accept at least some paternalistic restrictions
on freedom." Steinbock, supra note 2, at 128.
6. See, e.g., Larry Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, in SuRRo-
GATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 3, 7 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990) ("Those who
would ban or criminalize surrogacy have a heavy burden to explain why they would allow
the State to stifle activity that fulfills a human need.").
7. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell in SURROGATE MOTHER-
HOOD: POITICS AND PRUvACY 43, 44 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990) (arguing that surrogacy en-
tails the "commercialization of human embryos, the degradation of pregnancy, and the
future exacerbation of class distinctions and economic violence"). Lori Andrews, on the
other hand, points out that, although this argument is persuasive on its face, it "is reminis-
cent of the argument that feminists roundly reject in the abortion context: that it demeans
us all as a society to kill babies." Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for
Feminists, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLICS AND PRIVACY 167, 169 (Larry Gostin ed.,
1990).
8. MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 78 (1988) (noting affordable surrogacy
contracts would resolve the debate of whether qurrogacy exploits or liberates women).
9. See Gostin, supra note 6, at 3-8 (outlining the constitutional basis for surrogacy ar-
rangements under the purported right to privacy).
10. Cf CHRISTrNE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HuMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS
116-19 (1987) (drawing comparison of surrogacy with prostitution and noting prostitution
489
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question for legal policy is not whether but how to accommodate the
new developments [in reproductive technology.]" 1 The introduction
to the ABA's Model Surrogacy Act echoes this pragmatic view, stating
that, "[w] hile surrogacy poses potential problems ... surrogacy will be
used, and therefore, it is necessary to control these potential problems
and provide for the best interests of children born out of the use of
such services."12
This Comment argues that well-considered legislation can serve
as a "strategy of preventative ethics" that will better protect the inter-
ests of all parties to a surrogacy arrangement.13 Typically, surrogacy
disputes are framed as polarized power struggles that pit women
against women, or women against men, and that courts address only
when a surrogacy dispute has reached a "crisis" point. Instead, the
debate should emphasize the reduction of conflict and the prevention
of exploitation of all parties. 4 This Comment recognizes that some
issues raised by surrogacy inherently resist a satisfactory resolution.15
The Comment, therefore, proposes not to "find the perfect solution
... but to determine which of several flawed alternatives seems least
harmful." 6
The Comment explains in Part I the medical procedures involved
in surrogacy, and then in Part II examines some of the important fem-
inist criticisms of surrogacy as it is now practiced. Part III explores
has persisted despite criminalization). Harriet Blankfield, Director of Infertility Associates
International of Chevy Chase, Maryland, observed: "We screen out 95 of every 100 surro-
gate applicants. But if you believe there are abuses now, wait till it goes underground.
How many couples desperate for a biologically related baby will be so careful medically and
psychologically? None. They'll take the first woman who seems committed to them." An-
drew H. Malcolm, Steps to Control Surrogate Births Rekindle Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1988,
at Al, A21.
11. Marjorie Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity
for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 299 (1990).
12. MODEL SuRuoGAcy Acr, Introduction (Proposed official draft 1988) (ABA Section
on Family Law) (emphasis added).
13. Virginia L. Warren, Feminist Directions in Medical Ethics, 4 HYPATIA 73, 80-81 (1989).
14. Virginia Warren has described the difference in approaches as a distinction be-
tween "housekeeping" and "crisis" issues, and has explained it as follows:
[I] nformed consent[, for example,] is standardly [sic] interpreted as a crisis issue:
"Was an autonomous and informed consent obtained from the patient before this
treatment, or did the physician withhold relevant information or pressure the
patient?" Compare this to informed consent interpreted as a housekeeping issue:
"How should we foster the conditions which make informed consent more
likely?"
Id. at 79.
15. See Strasser, supra note 3, at 135; see also Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can
the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy Be Answered?, 68 IND. LJ. 205, 232 (1992) ("It is unrealistic
to believe that all of the harms associated with surrogacy can be eliminated.").
16. Strasser, supra note 3, at 135.
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approaches that judges and legislators have taken toward surrogacy,
first in other states and then in Maryland. Finally, Part IV proposes
model legislation and concludes with suggestions for additional re-
form. The Comment recognizes that the proposed legislation would
be significantly reinforced if it were accompanied by broader changes
in society and the medical profession. The proposal acknowledges,
moreover, that "the capacity of the new technology for good or evil
depends on the social context surrounding its use and application."17
I. BIOMEDIcAL BACKGROUND
Surrogacy, broadly defined, is an arrangement by which a woman
is impregnated by assisted conception, carries the resulting fetus, and
relinquishes all parental rights to the child at birth."8 There are two
types of surrogacy arrangements: genetic surrogacy and gestational
surrogacy. 9
Genetic surrogacy typically results from the artificial insemination
of a surrogate with the intended father's sperm. Specifically, the
sperm of the intended father is injected into the vagina of the surro-
gate, who then carries the resulting child until birth.2 ° Genetic surro-
gacy results in a child genetically related to the surrogate and to the
intended father.
Gestational surrogacy involves the removal of the intended
mother's egg through an invasive surgical procedure known as
laparoscopy.21 The egg is then placed in a petri dish together with the
17. Norma Juliet Wilder, Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The Femi-
nist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1043, 1055 (1986) (noting ultimate effect of technology
must be gauged within an historical perspective).
18. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 221 (1989) (describing modem surro-
gacy arrangements); Lieber, supra note 15, at 206.
19. For a general description of both types of surrogacy arrangements, see COMMrrlE
ON ETHics, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, PAMPHLET No. 88,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, (1990) [hereinafter ACOG PAMPHLET].
20. Field, supra note 8, at 34. Artificial insemination is arguably not a technology at all,
because it requires no more technology than a needleless syringe. Id.
21. Another method of assisted reproduction involves egg donation by a woman who is
not the intended mother. Her egg is retrieved, mixed with the sperm of the intended
father, and then implanted into the uterus of another woman. The implanted woman is
usually the intended mother. This surrogacy option is typically pursued when the gestator
has a normal uterus but a problem with her eggs. The gestator might be yet another
person. In that case, one woman is the egg donor, another is the gestator, and another is
the intended mother. See FIELD, supra note 8, at 36 (describing the various IVF proce-
dures). A discussion of the legal and ethical implications of these permutations and com-
binations of surrogacy involving egg donation is beyond the scope of this paper, but
ideally, states should address all of these reproductive technologies within a single piece of
legislation.
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intended father's sperm in a process known as in vitro fertilization
(IVF).22 If the sperm fertilizes the egg, the egg develops into an em-
bryo which is then implanted into the uterus of a genetically unre-
lated surrogate. 2' For both the intended mother and the surrogate,
the gestational surrogacy process is much riskier and more compli-
cated than that of genetic surrogacy.24 Gestational surrogacy requires
not only laparoscopy for the intended mother but also extensive drug
therapy for both women in order to synchronize their hormonal
cycles.25
II. THE FEMINIST CRITICISM OF SURROGACY
It is impossible to identify a unified feminist perspective on surro-
gacy. Indeed, feminists are deeply divided on the issue. 26 Some see
surrogacy as simply one more battle in the long war to increase wo-
men's personal freedom to control their own reproduction.27 Others
view surrogacy as a form of slavery or prostitution.28 Still others see
surrogacy as part of a patriarchal conspiracy to control women's bod-
ies and reproduction 9 and seek to prohibit surrogacy in order to pro-
22. FIELD, supra note 8, at 35.
23. ACOG PAMPHLET, supra note 19, at 1.
24. See, e.g., Molly Gordy, Egg Donor Rejected; Problems Plague Unlicensed Center, NEWSDAY,
May 8, 1992, at 6 (describing one donor who developed ovarian cysts as a result of egg
donation).
25. See The New Motherhood, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1991, at Z12. Whether differences in
risk, as well as in genetic or gestational methods of surrogacy, should translate into differ-
ent legal treatments is an important and difficult question that is beyond the scope of this
Comment. See also infra notes 288-291 and accompanying text.
26. During the Baby M trial, for example, the New Jersey chapter of the National Or-
ganization for Women (NOW) could not reach consensus on the issue. According to
Linda Bowker, head of the local NOW chapter, "[t] he feelings ranged the gamut." Iver
Peterson, Baby M Trial Splits Ranks of Feminists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1987, at B1.
We do believe that women ought to control their own bodies, and we don't want
to play big brother or big sister and tell them what to do [the president of the
chapter said.] But on the other hand, we don't want to see the day when women
are turned into breeding machines.
Id.
27. SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETmICS AND HEALTH CARE 126
(1992) ("Feminists have a long history of supporting the protection of personal reproduc-
tive control."). Sherwin argues that while the ability to avoid unwanted pregnancy is per-
sonally and politically vital, involuntary childlessness can be just as compelling. See also
Andrews, supra note 7, at 167-68 ("A cornerstone [of feminist policy on reproduction] has
been the idea that women have a right to reproductive choice-to be able to contracept,
abort, or get pregnant.").
28. Andrea Dworkin, for example, argues that all reproductive technologies "make the
womb extractable from the woman as a whole person in the same way the vagina (or sex) is
now." ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT WING WOMEN 187-88 (1983).
29. GENA CoREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFI-
CIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTICrIAL. WOMBS 314 (1985) ("[Men] are beyond ... giving ...
492 [VOL. 54:488
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tect women. Although feminist criticism is not monolithic, the
rationales fall into two related, general categories: the symbolic harm
to society and the potential harm to individual surrogates.30
A. The Harm to Society
Critics argue that surrogacy is equivalent to baby-selling, contrib-
utes to an undesirable "commodification" of reproduction, 31 and
thereby "demeans us all as a society."32 These commentators argue
that compensation for the surrogate makes the practice especially ob-
jectionable.33 The Baby M court, for instance, noted that the "pay-
ment of money" made surrogacy "illegal, perhaps criminal, and
potentially degrading to women."34 By this criticism, only unpaid sur-
rogacy is a "plausible resolution to the surrogacy controversy,"3 5 be-
cause it would not only greatly restrict the number of women willing
birth with their electronic fetal monitors, their forceps, their knives. Now they have
laboratories.")
30. Andrews, supra note 7, at 169-76. Andrews actually analyzes three categories of risk,
the third of which is the potential risk to the child. Id. at 176-78. The Baby M court, for
example, noted that the child might suffer from the knowledge that she was born as the
result of a commercial transaction. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1250. This argument, how-
ever, is deeply flawed. First, it relies on "tradition, stereotype, and societal tolerance or
intolerance as a driving force for determining what is in a child's best interest"--criteria
against which feminists have long fought. Andrews, supra note 7, at 176. Second, it is
arguable that children resulting from surrogacy might well have an advantage over many
children because they are clearly wanted by their parents. Even if being a surrogacy child
is not an advantage, it is hard to see how it would be a liability.
[P]arents in a surrogacy arrangement want children for reasons probably no less
humane or understandable than those of parents who reproduce by conventional
means. Conventional parents, like surrogate parents, have children for many rea-
sons, some for love, some for money, and some because they have a certain image
of the offspring they would like to have. There is no ideal reason for choosing a
mate and having a baby.
Gostin, supra note 6, at 11.
It would seem that the biggest potential risk to a child of surrogacy is that he or she
may not be wanted if born with a "defect" of some kind. Although such a risk is not unique
to children of surrogacy, it is plausibly greater for these children because the potential
parents have a less clear stake in the child than is the case for traditional birth parents. See
infra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
31. See FIELD, supra note 8, at 25-32 (discussing the commercial ramifications of the
surrogacy arrangement).
32. Andrews, supra note 7, at 169.
33. FIELD, supra note 8, at 23. The term compensation in this context means an extra
fee in addition to reimbursement for medical expenses related to the pregnancy. The
surrogate is almost always reimbursed for medical expenses, even in "altruistic" surrogacy
agreements. See infra notes 270-279 and accompanying text.
34. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234.
35. FIELD, supra note 8, at 33.
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to be surrogates 6 but also reduce the commercial exploitation of sur-
rogacy."s Critics also argue that while surrogacy enhances the pro-
spective mother's autonomy by providing her with an additional
reproductive choice, it undermines the collective autonomy of wo-
men. 38 In this sense, surrogacy fosters a societal perception of women
as "breeders" and suggests the evolution of an entire class of "breeder
women."
3 9
This concern is especially compelling in the context of gesta-
tional surrogacy. In theory, gestational surrogacy could be used to
allow women capable of bearing children to assign the labor of doing
so to someone else,4" and thereby further increase the potential for
economic exploitation. 41 Gestational surrogacy implicates the poten-
36. Whether or not prohibiting fees beyond compensation for medical expenses and
related expenses would effectively end surrogacy is a matter of some dispute. See infra note
47 and accompanying text.
37. FIELD, supra note 8, at 23.
38. See CoREA, supra note 29, at 272-73.
39. See, e.g., id. at 272-82. These critics often cite the fictional Republic of Gilead in
Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale as an example of the kind of society that could
result if surrogacy and other reproductive technologies continue in use. Lori Andrews
points out, however, that the policies a society devises and implements to regulate new
technologies are as important as the technologies themselves. Andrews, supra note 7, at
167. She points out that in The Handmaid's Tale, "it was actually policy changes-the
criminalization of abortion and the banning of women from the paid labor force-that
created the preconditions for a dehumanizing and harmful version of surrogacy." Id.
40. See, e.g., CoREA, supra note 29, at 272-73. Some critics have argued that to allow
surrogacy to continue is to proceed down a slippery slope that may pander to women who
find pregnancy inconvenient because of their careers, travel plans, and even for women
who simply wish to avoid stretch marks. Id.
41. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 87 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) ("The poten-
tial for.., exploitation [in surrogacy] is much broader than being just gender-based, it is
economic-based as well."). Corea's argument asserts that rich or upper middle class wo-
men would gladly assign the task of bearing their children to someone else if they could,
and that this "someone" would undoubtedly be of a lower socioeconomic background.
CoRr., supra note 29, at 228-31. Statistics on this point are not definitive, but they do not
suggest as wide a social or economic disparity between surrogates and intended mothers as
one might expect. See R. Alta Charo, Legislative Approaches to Surrogate Motherhood, in SuRRo-
GATE MOTHERHOOD: PoLTcs AND PRIVACY 88, 89 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). Ms. Charo
states:
Agencies reported that approximately 64 percent of their clients have a house-
hold income over $50,000, with an additional 25 percent earning $30,000 to
$50,000 per year. Overall, the services reported that at least 37 percent of their
clients are college-educated, while another 54 percent have attended graduate
school. Agencies report that the women waiting to be hired as surrogate mothers
are generally non-Hispanic, Protestant whites .... Fewer than 35 percent of
those waiting to be hired... had ever attended college, and only 4 percent had
attended any graduate school. Thirty percent earn from $30,000 to $50,000 per
year, but two thirds (66%) earn less than $30,000.
494
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tial for racial exploitation because gestational surrogacy can allow a
white couple to create their own, genetically related white offspring,
and pay an African-American or other minority woman, as was the
case in Johnson v. Calvert,42 to bear it for them.43
B. The Harm to Individual Surrogates
Not surprisingly, critics also argue that surrogacy arrangements
are harmful to the individual surrogate." They contend that it is im-
possible for a woman to grant the necessary informed consent in or-
der to become a surrogate mother for two reasons. First, her consent
is never informed because the hormonal changes that accompany
pregnancy make it impossible for a surrogate to predict how she will
feel when she relinquishes the child at birth.4' This argument is
based on the assumption that it is "unnatural" for a mother to give up
her child under any circumstance. 46 Second, critics argue that con-
sent to become a surrogate is never fully voluntary because surrogates
only enter into these agreements out of economic necessity.4 7 In Baby
M, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court implicitly adopted
both of these arguments:
Under the contract, the natural mother [in this case, the ge-
netic surrogate,] is irrevocably committed before she ever
knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never
makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly
42. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the couple who donated the egg and sperm,
not the gestating woman who was Hispanic, had the legal right to the child).
43. The reverse may, of course, hold as well. Whether these possibilities justify dispa-
rate legal treatment is another question and one that this Comment is unable to resolve.
See infra notes 288-293 and accompanying text.
44. Andrews, supra note 7, at 171-76.
45. Id. at 172-73.
46. Id.
47. FIELD, supra note 8, at 72 (arguing surrogacy contracts are not voluntary because
society does not offer women enough economic alternatives). This argument assumes that
women would not choose to become surrogates if they had other economic options or if
no compensation were permitted, an assumption that is vigorously debated. See Annas,
supra note 7, at 45 ("Even [surrogacy's] strongest supporters freely admit that if they could
not pay women a large fee for giving up their children, they would be out of business.").
Field's argument appears to contradict her earlier recognition that, "[tihere are ... cir-
cumstances in which it is easy to believe a recital of no compensation: some surrogacy
arrangements involve a sister or good friend. But even among strangers, many motives
besides monetary compensation can contribute to the decision to become a surrogate
mother." FILD, supra note 8, at 19-22. Field cites reasons such as compensation for a
previous experience with abortion or adoption, or simply that the woman enjoys preg-
nancy. Id. Her compensation argument also "implies nothing about whether surrogacy
should be permitted when society refuises to provide these other alternatives." Strasser, supra note
3, at 141.
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any decision prior to the baby's birth is uninformed in the
most important sense, and any decision after that, compelled
by a pre-existing contractual commitment, the threat of a
lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000 payment is less
than totally voluntary.48
Some argue that surrogacy's harm to women is not limited to the
surrogate. They contend that the "choice" of the intended parents,
and particularly of the intended mother, to pursue surrogacy as a re-
productive option is not a truly free choice either.49 Critics argue that
the availability of surrogacy technology ° coupled with the social de-
valuation of women who are not able to have children 5' make the
"choice" to pursue all available means of reproduction an illusory
one.52 "To choose to be childless is still socially disapproved and to be
childless in fact is to be stigmatized as selfish and uncaring. In such a
situation, the offer of the hope of motherhood is a coercive offer.""
Similarly, some argue that to choose the surrogacy process is not
an exercise in autonomy due to the paternalistic nature of the medical
establishment.54 Susan Sherwin notes:
48. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (NJ. 1988).
49. See CoREA, supra note 29, at 27-30.
50. Paul Lauritzen, What tice Parenthood?, HAsTrNcs CENTER REP., Mar./Apr. 1990, at
38, 38-39 (noting critics' argument that the very existence of these technologies constitutes
a coercive offer). Lauritzen observes that social concepts of masculinity also influence the
choice of surrogacy.
In a culture that defines virility so completely in phallocentric terms, infertility
can also threaten male identity, for infertility is often confused with impotence
.... It is hard to know which is worse: to endure a toast on Father's Day made
with great fanfare by someone who knows full well your efforts to become a father
or to suffer yet another comment about "shooting blanks."
Id.
51. CoRA, supra note 29, at 15.
A woman who failed to produce a child could be reproached, ridiculed, and,
during the Middle Ages, even burned as a witch. Husbands in polygamous mar-
riages might replace her with a new wife and relegate her to the level of a servant.
In many Islamic lands, they could cast her out. She could be divorced, leaving
her isolated, socially stigmatized, often poverty-stricken. Patriarchal societies
made it easy for men to dispose of barren women. For example, under Jewish
law, a husband has the right to sue for divorce if his wife is barren. But a woman
may not sue for divorce on grounds that her husband is sterile. "In centuries
past," wrote infertility counselor Barbara Eck Menning, "the woman who was
childless was as useless and despised as a piece of land that would yield no crops.
The same word was given to both-barren."
Id.
52. Lauritzen notes that infertility specialists "simply assume that patients will pursue
all available treatments... ." Lauritzen, supra note 50, at 41.
53. Id. at 40. Lauritzen describes the surrogacy problem as a "tyranny of technology."
Id. at 39.
54. See CoazA, supra note 29, at 303.
496 [VOL. 54:488
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Most arguments in support of IVF are based on appeals to
the rights of the individual to choose such technology. Femi-
nists urge us to look carefully at these autonomy based argu-
ments, however, because as IVF is usually practiced, it does
not altogether satisfy the motivation of fostering personal
freedom. Like many other forms of reproductive technol-
ogy, IVF is controlled by medical specialists and not by the
women who seek it.1
5
These critics argue that the paternalism inherent in any doctor-pa-
tient relationship is likely to be more pronounced and abusive when
the patient is a woman.56 In this context, surrogacy is the latest chap-
ter in the long history of experimentation, exploitation, and control
over women's bodies by a patriarchal medical establishment.57 This
history includes DES, the Pill, estrogen replacement therapy, tranquil-
izers, and unnecessary hysterectomies, cesarean sections, and radical
mastectomies.5" Critics of surrogacy contend that the patriarchal es-
tablishment recharacterized infertility as a "disease" in order to serve
its own interests and to disguise its experimentation on women's bod-
ies as a "cure."59
III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SURROGACY CONTRACTS
In states that lack legislation clearly directed toward the regula-
tion of surrogacy, courts have taken a variety of approaches to surro-
gacy contracts. Generally, the courts have relied on statutes that cover
adoption and custody determinations or upon the common law of
contracts to resolve surrogacy disputes.' Surrogacy legislation is
needed because none of these approaches is appropriate. Each ap-
proach fails to address the unique complexities of surrogacy. The
inappropriateness of existing models is underlined by a judicial his-
tory that has reached inconsistent and conflicting results.6" Regula-
tory legislation is needed to provide a measure of uniformity and
predictability for the parties to surrogacy agreements. The legislature,
55. SHERWIN, supra note 27, at 126. See CoREA, supra note 29, at 303 (suggesting the
choice to participate in an IVF program is conditioned by a society that condemns childless
women).
56. See CoREA, supra note 29, at 3.
57. Id. at 304-14.
58. SHERWIN, supra note 27, at 151-53. Sherwin chronicles "a long, historical pattern of
medical attempts to extend authority over an increasing number of spheres of women's
lives." Id. at 150.
59. CoREA, supra note 29, at 303-14.
60. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)
(applying adoption rule that prohibits enforcement of pre-birth consent to surrogacy).
61. See infra notes 209-228 and accompanying text.
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moreover, is the proper forum to resolve the complex issues of public
policy involved in surrogacy.62
A. Judicial Analysis of Adoption Statutes
Many courts have applied adoption statutes to surrogacy arrange-
ments.6" The New Jersey Supreme Court held in Baby M,64 which in-
volved genetic surrogacy, that the contract violated a state law that
prohibits payment in connection with an adoption, also known as
"baby-selling."65 The court stated that because "the money is being
paid to obtain an adoption and not ... for the personal services of
[the surrogate]: .. . [i] t strains credulity to claim that these arrange-
ments.., really amount to something other than a private placement
adoption for money."66 The court further held a contractual provi-
sion that the surrogate's consent was irrevocable violated the New
Jersey statute67 that states that a person's consent to adoption is irrevo-
cable only after the birth of the child, only if in writing, and only in
conjunction with an approved adoption agency.6' The court there-
fore refused to permit Mrs. Stem, the intended mother, to adopt the
baby.69 Custody was granted to the biological father, Mr. Stern, 70 and
the surrogate, Mrs. Whitehead, was granted visitation rights.71
A similar approach to genetic surrogacy was taken in In re Adop-
tion of PauL72 A New York court found that the forty-nine page surro-
gate parenting agreement signed by the parties violated the state's
adoption statutes73 prohibiting compensation in connection with an
62. Our doctrine of separation of powers directs this approach. See infra note 96 and
accompanying text.
63. See generally Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 209 (applying adoption stan-
dard to surrogacy); but seeJohnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) ("Gestational
surrogacy differs in crucial respects from adoption and so is not subject to the adoption
statutes."). The Johnson court held that consent was voluntary because the surrogate con-
sented before conception and that the payment was for gestational services rather than to
surrender "parental" rights to the child. Id.
64. 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988). See supra note 2 for a description of the case.
65. Id. at 1240.
66. Id. at 1241-42. But see Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 211-12 (holding
surrogacy does not constitute baby-selling because consent is given prior to conception).
67. NJ. STAT. ANN. 9:3-54 (West 1993).
68. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1244-45.
69. Id. at 1251-53.
70. Id. at 1258-59.
71. Id. at 1263.
72. 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1990) (holding the surrogacy agreement violated a
statutory prohibition against compensation for adoption).
73. Id. at 817.
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adoption.74 The court voided the transaction.75 The court, neverthe-
less, agreed to grant the adoption if the surrogate submitted an affida-
vit swearing that she "[would] not request, accept or receive the
$10,000 promised to her in exchange for surrender of her child."76
The prospective parents also had to submit affidavits swearing not to
pay the surrogate."
On the other hand, in Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Common-
wealth,78 the Supreme Court of Kentucky expressly held that surrogacy
does not constitute baby-selling within the meaning of an adoption
statute quite similar to New York's because the child was not con-
ceived when the contract was made. 79 The Kentucky court accepted
the view that consent given prior to conception is sufficiently differ-
ent, or less susceptible to coercion, than consent given afterwards, and
therefore, surrogacy does not constitute "baby-selling."8 ° In Surrogate
Parenting Associates, the state's attorney general had sought to revoke
the charter of the defendant corporation on the grounds that its activ-
ities violated Kentucky's adoption statute.81 The court rejected that
claim, holding that surrogacy contracts are voidable, but not illegal or
presumptively void. 2 The conflicting holdings in Kentucky and New
York illustrate how even when courts rely on the same statutory para-
digm, they often reach different and even directly opposite results.8"
B. Judicial Analysis of Custody Statutes
Other courts have characterized disputes pursuant to surrogacy
contracts as standard custody battles and, consequently, apply a "best
interests of the child" standard. 4 In In re Adoption of Matthew B.,85 a
genetic surrogacy case, the surrogate was artificially inseminated, gave
birth, and then signed a consent agreement.8 6 Eight months later,
74. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 374(b) (prohibiting "any compensation of a thing of value,
directly or indirectly, in connection with the placing out an adoption of a child...").
75. 550 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18.
76. Id. at 818-19.
77. Id. at 819.
78. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
79. Id. at 211.
80. Id. at 211-20.
81. Id. at 210. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (prohibiting the sale, purchase or
procurement of any child for the purposes of adoption).
82. Id. at 213-14.
83. See infra notes 209-228 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Adoption of T., 44 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 699, 704 (1965) (stating the purpose
of the "best interests" standard is to maximize a child's opportunity to develop into a stable
and well-adjusted adult).
85. 284 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1685 (1992).
86. Id. at 21.
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after the contract had been fully performed, the surrogate sought to
withdraw her consent to the agreement and argued that the illegality
of the contract was sufficient basis for her withdrawal.8 7 The court
refused to rule on the legality of the contract and instead considered
the case strictly as an adoption proceeding."' The court then applied
a "best interests of the child"' standard, denied the surrogate's peti-
tion, and allowed the adoption by the intended mother to proceed.9"
C. Judicial Analysis of Contract Law
Finally, some courts apply a contract law paradigm in order to
enforce the parties' bargain." In Johnson v. Calvert, 2 which involved a
gestational surrogacy arrangement, the Supreme Court of California
held that the surrogate had no rights with respect to the child she
bore because the intended mother, who donated the egg, was the nat-
87. Id. at 24.
88. Id. at 22. "[W]e do not attempt to resolve the debate over the desirability or valid-
ity of surrogate contracts .... We rely instead on those considerations mandated by stat-
ute, the best interests of the child." Id.
89. Id. The "best interests" standard is "an elusive guideline that belies rigid defini-
tion." Adoption of T., 44 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 699, 704 (1975). The determination typically
includes a consideration of several factors: the child's age; the extent of the child's bond-
ing with the adoptive parents; and their ability to provide adequate care and guidance to
the child. Id See also George P. Smith, II, The Case of Baby M: Love's Labor Lost, in SuRRo-
GATE MOTHERHOOD: PoLITcs AND PRIvAcy 233, 235 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990) (arguing that
the best interests standard "defies a uniform standard of application" and listing factors to
be considered).
90. In re Adoption of Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. at 30-32. The court's finding that the
child had lived with the adoptive mother continuously since she was four days old was the
decisive factor in allowing the adoption to proceed. Compare In re Baby Girl Lj., 505
N.Y.S.2d 813 (1986), in which a New York court found the parties' surrogate parenting
agreement voidable, but not necessarily void depending on whether the state's adoption
laws were violated. Id. at 817. Despite "strong reservations about these arrangements both
on moral and ethical grounds," the court approved the fee paid to the surrogate and per-
mitted the adoption as being in the best interests of the child. Id. at 815-17. The court
found nothing in existing law to prohibit surrogate parenting contracts, but called upon
the legislature to give direction on the matter. Id. at 818.
91. But see Strasser, supra note 3, at 135.
Perhaps one of the few areas of consensus [in the surrogacy debate] is that surro-
gacy contracts should be viewed in light of one of two legal paradigms-contract
law or family law. Use of the former would lead to surrogacy contracts being
upheld while use of the latter would lead to the contracts being held void or
voidable. Unfortunately, this consensus has retarded rather than advanced the
debate. It is neither clear that contract law would make such agreements enforce-
able nor clear that family law would make such contracts void or voidable.
Id.
92. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
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ural mother, and the intended father, who donated the sperm, was
the natural father.9 3 The court held,
But for [the intended parents'] acted-on intention, the child
would not exist .... Although the gestative function [the
surrogate] performed was necessary to bring about the
child's birth, it is safe to say that [she] would not have been
given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child had she,
prior to implantation of the zygote, manifested her own in-
tent to be the child's mother. No reason appears why [the
surrogate's] later change of heart should vitiate the determi-
nation that Crispina is the child's natural mother.
94
The court reasoned that the intentions of the parties, as expressed in
their contract, should dictate which parties have legal parent status.95
D. Why None of the Former Approaches is Appropriate
It should be noted that the courts in several of the above men-
tioned cases openly pleaded for legislative action to address the issue
of surrogacy. 6 Although courts have dealt with this issue out of neces-
sity, it is clear that they are not satisfied to adapt present legal
frameworks to the unique considerations surrogacy raises. It is per-
suasively argued that to stretch current statutory schema over surro-
gacy arrangements
ignore[s] and trivialize[s] distinctions between conventional
pre-technology procreation and the transactions and rela-
tionships in the surrogacy arrangement. To say that the fac-
tual issues are 'the same' as if [the parties to a surrogacy
contract] had simply had a child out of wedlock ignores the
centrally important fact that modem reproductive tech-
niques allow the separation of personal and sexual intimacy
from procreation. It ignores that these reproductive tech-
93. Id. at 782.
94. Id. at 786. Shultz, supra note 11, at 323 ("[1]ntentions that are voluntarily chosen,
deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal
parenthood.").
95. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786.
96. See, e.g., Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784 ("We are all too aware that the proper forum for
resolution of this issue is the Legislature, where empirical data, largely lacking from this
record, can be studied and rules of general applicability developed."); In re M.S.M. and
G.M. Adoption No. 11171, slip. op. at 19 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md., 1993) ("[I]t is
clear to the Court that the prerogative to prohibit or permit these arrangements belongs
not to it, but to the General Assembly."); Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704
S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ky. 1986) ("If there are social and ethical problems in the solutions social
science offers, these are problems of public policy that belong in the legislative domain,
not in the judicial .. ").
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niques have different meanings and. occur in different fac-
tual contexts than those contemplated by baby-selling
statutes. It ignores that the father here differs in important
ways from stereotypical unwed fathers. 97
"Baby-selling statutes," for example, were intended to prevent
economic pressures from causing parents to sell already-born or ex-
pected children that they would otherwise keep.98 This potential for
duress is arguably not present in a surrogacy arrangement, since the
surrogate has specifically decided to become pregnant with the inten-
tion of parting with the child. Contrary to the Baby M holding, con-
sent that is given before pregnancy makes the surrogate's consent
more, rather than less, voluntary and informed.99
Custody law is based on traditional assumptions that are not valid
in the context of surrogacy. For example, much custody law rests
upon the assumption that unwed fathers are "uninterested" in their
children. 100 This is clearly not appropriate in the context of surro-
gacy, where both intended parents have gone to great lengths to be-
come parents and are clearly "interested" in the child.
The contract law paradigm is also problematic. For example,
many commentators suggest that contracts are simply inappropriate
in the family context, and that surrogacy contracts are necessarily con-
tracts for the sale of a child.10 1 Although surrogacy contracts can be
designed so that they are truly contracts for the service of the surro-
gate, surrogacy services are simply not the same as "fixing a car or
typing a manuscript."102 Surrogacy (and indeed, pregnancy) involves
significant danger to life and health, is extremely time-intensive
(twenty-four hours a day for nine months plus recovery time), and
requires "a much greater investment of the self than do other services
97. Shultz, supra note 11, at 376.
98. "The concern is that a species of duress infects the decision to part with the child."
Id. at 376 n.253.
99. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 211-12.
100. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 399 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("Our law has given the unwed mother custody of her illegitimate children precisely be-
cause it is she who bears the child and because the vast majority of unwed fathers have
been unknown, unavailable, or simply uninterested.").
101. But see Strasser, supra note 3, at 139 ("[T]he claim that contracts are foreign to the
family context are false. For example, marriage is a type of contract."). See also A.M.
Capron & M.J. Radin, Choosing Family Law Over Contract Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate
Motherhood, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: PoLrrIcs AND PRIvAcY 59, 63-64 (Larry Gostin ed.,
1990) (suggesting contractual nature of surrogacy arrangements will commercialize child
bearing).
102. Strasser, supra note 3, at 140.
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(both physiologically and emotionally).""' Even if the contract
model were entirely acceptable, it would not make surrogacy contracts
necessarily enforceable. More than a hundred years of legal prece-
dent holds that the remedy of specific performance is not available for
personal service contracts.'O°
The existing statutory schema, therefore, are not entirely appro-
priate to the unique relationships and intentions of the parties to a
surrogacy agreement. 0 5 This is not to say, however, that surrogacy
legislation should not draw on existing legal principles. Although
there are significant and relevant differences between surrogacy and
contract law, adoption law, and custody law,' °6 this Comment pro-
poses a solution that draws upon the most useful attributes of these
approaches in order to protect the interests of all parties.10'
Adapting some principles of adoption law to surrogacy, such as a
"grace period" during which the surrogate may change her mind and
revoke her consent to the agreement, would be a valuable strategy
because it is both protective and respectful of the surrogate. 08 The
requirement of an extensive evaluation of the intended parents, as
required by adoption law, is also appropriate because it would protect
the interests of the child. A consideration of the "best interests of the
child," the critical standard in custody disputes, could be effected by
appointing a guardian ad litem for the child. The implementation of
safeguards such as full disclosure of risks and surrogacy success rates
to ensure informed consent-precautions that are crucial to the valid-
ity of a contract-are also desirable in order to avoid disputes and
serve the interests of all the parties.
Even if an existing scheme were completely applicable to surro-
gacy, legislation would still be needed to provide uniformity and pre-
dictability to surrogacy agreements. The current lack of clear
standards creates a situation in which "logic will not select for a judge
which approach to follow; instead the judge will be heavily influenced
103. Id.
104. Lumley v. Wagner, 43 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852); see also Strasser, supra note 3.
105. Randall P. Bezanson, A Comment on the Matter of Baby M and the Limits of Judicial
Authority, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, PoLrrMCs AND PpRVACY 243 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
106. But see id. ("Existing statutory provisions and common law doctrines are relevant to
the surrogacy question only as they are grounded on assumptions about parentage, family,
and the reproductive process. But these assumptions are simply irrelevant to the dilemmas
posed by surrogacy arrangements .... ") (emphasis added).
107. See Strasser, supra note 3, at 138-40 (stating that existing statutory models, although
helpful and at least partially applicable, are not decisive). Strasser argues that application
of the contract model does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that surrogacy contracts
are enforceable. Id.
108. See ACOG PAMPHLET, supra note 19, at 3.
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by her or his own views concerning whether the state ought to pro-
hibit these contracts or whether instead the contracts serve a socially
legitimate purpose." 1°9
IV. WHAT STATE LEGISLATURES HAVE DONE
A. States Prohibiting Surrogacy
Eighteen states have addressed the legality of surrogate parenting
contracts. 110 Through legislation, many of these states have elimi-
nated surrogacy as a reproductive option."' Arizona,"
2 Indiana,'1
Washington, 4 Louisiana,' 5 Nebraska," 6 New York,"
7 and Utah"18
have made any type of surrogacy contract void and unenforceable.
Other states, including Kentucky" 9 and North Dakota,'20 have de-
cided that commercial surrogacy contracts are void and unenforce-
able as against public policy.' 12 Michigan has gone so far as to
criminalize surrogacy.1
2
B. Nevada and Arkansas
Nevada and Arkansas both permit surrogacy and regulate it, but
only in limited ways. Nevada's statute, which is the more restrictive,
requires contracts to specify the respective rights of each party, includ-
ing the parentage of the child, custody in the event of a change in
circumstances, and the respective responsibilities and liabilities of the
109. FIELD, supra note 8, at 19.
110. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATES wrrH SuRRoGAcy LAws
(1993) [hereinafter NCSL].
111. Larry Gostin has argued that it is unconstitutional for the state to prohibit or
criminalize surrogacy arrangements. Gostin, supra note 6, at 4. Surrogacy is also "dead" in
Oklahoma and Oregon, which have attorney general opinions that state it is illegal, and in
New Jersey, after the Bay M opinion. See NCSL, supra note 110.
112. AiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1991).
113. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (Bums Supp. 1994).
114. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.240 (West Supp. 1994).
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.2713 (West 1991).
116. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25:21,200 (1989).
117. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §§ 121-124 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
118. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(1)(c) (Supp. 1994).
119. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1993).
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991).
121. Larry Gostin argues that, "banning payment for gestational services would deprive
the woman of the right to be paid for valued labor." Gostin, supra note 6, at 9. See aLso
Lieber, supra note 15, at 232 ("To prohibit a surrogate from selling her reproductive capac-
ities but allowing [sic] her to give them away devalues and exploits women.").
122. The Michigan statute mandates that a "participating party... who knowingly en-
ters into a surrogate parentage contract for compensation is guilty of a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year."
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.859(2) (West 1993).
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contracting parties.1 2 Nevada outlaws the payment of anything other
than "medical and necessary living expenses related to the birth of the
child as specified in the contract." 2 4 The statute aims to require that
the parties plan for contingencies and essentially make their own law
with regard to the surrogacy arrangement, but offers little or no gui-
dance on the substance of the planning, except to ban compensation.
Arkansas regulates surrogacy a bit more extensively and addresses
some aspects of it under its adoption laws.' 2 5 For example, payment
of fees conditioned upon relinquishment of parental rights is illegal,
but otherwise compensation is permitted. 126 Another Arkansas statute
establishes certain presumptions of parenthood when artificial insemi-
nation is used.127 A child born to a woman by means of artificial in-
semination is presumed to be the child of that woman and her
husband, except in the case of a surrogate mother, in which case the
child shall be that of:
(1) the biological father and the woman intended to be the
mother if the biological father is married; or
(2) the biological father only if unmarried; or
(3) the woman intended to be the mother in cases of a surro-
gate mother when an anonymous donor's sperm was utilized
for artificial insemination.128
Arkansas's statute adopts the presumption that the intended parents
are the legal parents of a child born of a surrogate mother, but offers
no regulation of the process nor of the content of the contract.
C. Forida
Florida requires the parties to have a contract before conception
pursuant to a gestational surrogacy arrangement. 129 "Commissioning
couples" need be only eighteen years old, but must be legally married,
and the intended mother must be either physically unable to gestate a
pregnancy to term or have her health or the health of the fetus at risk
if she becomes pregnant.13 0 The surrogate must also be eighteen,'
and is not required to have had a previous birth.
123. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (Michie 1993).
124. Id. § 126.045(3).
125. AR. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206 (Michie 1991).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 9-10-201.
128. Id. § 9-10-201(b) and (c).
129. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West 1993).
130. Id. § 742.15(1) and (2)(a).




Gestational surrogacy contracts in Florida must contain provi-
sions to the effect that a gestational surrogate is "the sole source of
consent with respect to clinical intervention and management of the
pregnancy."132 The surrogate must also agree to "submit to reason-
able medical evaluation and treatment and to adhere to reasonable
medical instructions about her prenatal health."' 3 Florida permits
slightly more compensation than Nevada, allowing the surrogate to be
compensated for her "reasonable living, legal, medical, psychological,
and psychiatric expenses . . . that are directly related to prenatal, in-
trapartal, and postpartal periods."'3 4 "The gestational surrogate must
agree to relinquish any parental rights upon the child's birth and to
proceed with the [prescribed] judicial proceedings."' 3 5 Conversely,
the intended parents are required to accept custody of, and assume
full parental rights and responsibilities for, the child immediately
upon the child's birth "regardless of any impairment of the child."3 6
Florida's law establishes that when at least one of the intended parents
is the genetic parent of the child, the intended parents are presumed
to be the parents.
37
D. New Hampshire and Virginia
New Hampshire and Virginia both have laws which make surro-
gacy contracts legal but unenforceable, that is, they are revocable at
the option of either party.' 38 These states have established the most
extensive schemes to govern the terms and enforcement of surrogacy
contracts as well as their oversight by the courts."l 9
1. New Hampshire.-In New Hampshire, only those surrogacy
contracts which are "pre-approved" by the courts will be recognized by
law.' 40 The parties to a surrogacy contract must petition the court for
132. Id. § 742.15(3) (a).
133. Id. § 742.15(3) (b). This provision creates the potential for conflict between the
surrogate's autonomy in medical decision-making, and her duty to receive prenatal care.
In conjunction with independent medical representation, however, the provision is a good
compromise which will serve to protect the interests of the intended parents and the child
without undue infringement on the rights of the surrogate.
134. Id. § 742.15(4).
135. Id. § 742.15(3)(c).
136. Id. § 742.15(3) (d).
137. Id. § 742.16(7). Compare to Arkansas's law, which establishes an intent-based pre-
sumption of parenthood even when neither of the intended parents has a genetic connec-
tion to the child. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 152-153 & 158-162.
139. Lieber, supra note 15, at 217-18.
140. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23 (1994).
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authorization of their contract prior to conception. 41 In order to ob-
tain such authorization, the court requires that all parties have under-
gone medical and psychological evaluations and that they have given
informed consent with full awareness of all the potential physical, psy-
chological, financial, and legal obligations under the contract.142 The
psychological evaluations must consider the person's suitability for
parenthood and include a home study of both the surrogate and the
intended parents. 4 ' The intended parents need not be married.' 44
The intended parents are responsible for all of the surrogate's preg-
nancy-related expenses, including lost wages, health and life insur-
ance, reasonable attorney's fees and court costs, and counseling
costs.'4 5 Indeed, the surrogate may be compensated only for these
expenses.' 46 The intended parents may also be liable for child sup-
port if they breach the agreement. 47 For a contract to be recognized
in New Hampshire, the intended mother must be physiologically un-
able to bear a child.
148
Like most regulating states, New Hampshire requires that the sur-
rogate be at least twenty-one years old, and have had at least one suc-
cessful pregnancy. 149 Contracts must specify that the surrogate is
solely responsible for all health care decisions regarding the child and
herself prior to birth and for a "grace period" thereafter, including
the decision to abort.150 If the surrogate becomes disabled, health
care decisions should then be made by the intended parents unless
the contract provides otherwise.15
New Hampshire provides that the surrogate may terminate the
contract and exercise her right to keep the child any time prior to
seventy-two hours after the birth of the child.'15 If there are "extenu-
ating circumstances," that period can be extended to one week.' 5 ' It
141. Id. § 168-B:21. Compare to Florida's statute, which only requires the parties have a
contract before conception. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
142. Id. § 168-B:18 and B:19.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 168-B:25.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 168-B:8.
148. Id. § 168-B:17.
149. Id.
150. Id. § 168-B:27.
151. Id. § 168-B:6.
152. Id. § 168-B:25.
153. Id.
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is a misdemeanor offense in New Hampshire to solicit or promote
surrogacy for compensation.15 4
2. Virginia.-The Virginia legislature has established a scheme
by which surrogacy contracts are legally recognized whether or not
they are pre-authorized, although it treats the two types differently. 155
If a contract is pre-authorized, the intended parents are deemed the
legal parents of the resulting child.'56 If not pre-authorized, the gesta-
tional mother and her husband are presumed to be the child's legal
parents.'5 7
In order to obtain pre-authorization, the surrogate, her husband,
and the intended parents must sign the surrogacy contract and then
petition the court for approval. 158 The contract approval process, if
elected, is similar to New Hampshire's mandatory one. Both of the
intended parents, as well as the surrogate and her husband, must
meet the standard of fitness required of adoptive parents, which is
based on a home study. 159 All parties must also undergo physical and
psychological examinations and receive counseling about the possible
effects of the surrogacy arrangement. 60 If the court finds that the
consent of all the parties was informed and voluntary, it will approve
the contract. 61 The court must then appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of the child and, if necessary, counsel to repre-
sent the interests of the surrogate. 62 If, however, the contract is not
pre-approved by a court, Virginia's statute treats genetic and gesta-
tional surrogacy differently. 6 ' If the parties have a genetic surrogacy
arrangement, then the woman giving birth to the child is presumed to
be the mother."' If the intended mother is the genetic parent, then
she is presumed to be the mother.1 65 If either of the intended parents
154. Id. § 168-B:16(I).
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie Supp. 1994).
156. Id. § 20-158(D).
157. Id. § 20-158(A).
158. At least one of the parties must reside in Virginia for the court to have jurisdiction.
Id. § 20-157.
159. Id. § 20-160(A).
160. Id. § 20-160(B).
161. Id. § 20-160(A).
162. Id.
163. As previously discussed, the resolution of whether different legal rights should be
accorded to gestational versus genetic surrogates is not clear. Virginia's solution to this
question, however, seems problematic and unfair to the gestational surrogate. See infra
notes 286-292 and accompanying text.
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(E)(1).
165. Id.
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is a genetic parent, then the intended father is the child's father.' 66 If
neither of the intended parents is a genetic contributor to the child,
then the surrogate and her husband are the parents.167 The intended
parents may then obtain parental rights only through an adoption
proceeding. 6'
Virginia permits compensation to the surrogate only for "reason-
able medical and ancillary costs," whether or not the contract is pre-
approved.' 69 This allowance includes compensation for "the costs of
the performance of the assisted conception," health care costs during
and immediately following the pregnancy, "reasonable costs for medi-
cations and maternity clothes, and any additional and reasonable costs
for housing and other living expenses attributable to the
pregnancy."17
0
E. The ABA Model Surrogacy Act
The ABA's Section on Family Law has proposed a model surro-
gacy act, which sets out extensive regulation of surrogacy contracts. 17 1
Like New Hampshire and Virginia, it requires counseling, physical
and mental evaluations of the surrogate and the intended parents, as
well as testing and evaluation of all parties to a surrogacy contract. 72
The Model Act also specifies the terms of surrogacy contracts.
For example, a surrogacy agreement must be in writing, state that the
intended parents are responsible for all medical expenses and life in-
surance for the surrogate with minimum benefits of $100,000, and
state the compensation, if any, to the providers of genetic materials
and to the surrogate.173 The Model Act does, however, place some
restrictions on compensation. Section 3(b) of the Model Act provides
that the minimum and maximum fees permitted to be paid to a surro-
gate will be determined by an administrative surrogacy fee agency,
consisting of three persons. 74 The Model Act requires the agency to
re-evaluate the range of compensation every two years, and provides
166. Id. § 20-158(E) (2).
167. Id. § 20-158(E) (3).
168. Id.
169. Id § 20-156.
170. Id.
171. MODEL SumoGcycv Acr (Proposed official draft 1988). An exhaustive discussion of
the Model Act's provisions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
172. MODEL SuRROGACy Acr § 4.
173. Id. § 5.
174. Id. § 3(b). The members of the panel are to be appointed every two years. One
member is appointed by the Governor and the other two by the legislature. Id.
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that the maximum fee cannot exceed one hundred fifty percent of
the minimum fee.
175
As in most of the statutes already discussed, the Model Act re-
quires surrogacy contracts to state that the intended parent or parents
"shall take custody of and parental responsibility for [the child] ...
regardless of any mental condition or defect."1 76 The Model Act also
delineates the rights and responsibilities of the parties in the event of
a breach. 177 The Act grants the intended parents a cause of action
against the surrogate if she terminates the pregnancy voluntarily, and
not because of medical necessity.17 8 If termination is medically neces-
sary, the surrogate is entitled to be paid a share of the total compensa-
tion in proportion to the actual period of gestation, medical expenses
[if the agreement so provides], and reasonable attorney's fees and
costs to the surrogate for the enforcement of her rights.179 Especially
notable is the Act's provision for a specific performance remedy.
Either of the parties has the right to "have the court order and en-
force the delivery of the child to the intended parent or parents." 80
F. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (US-
CACA) establishes the traditional presumption that a woman who
gives birth to a child is that child's mother, and her husband is the
child's father unless he did not consent to the assisted conception.18 1
The Act creates two alternatives from which legislatures may
choose. 82 Alternative A provides that the above presumption of par-
entage is overridden if the parties have entered into an agreement
which has been approved by a court prior to conception. 1 Alterna-
tive B provides that if the parties do not have a pre-approved contract,
the presumption stands.' 84
175. Id.
176. Id. § 5(g). The Act also requires the contract to specify that the surrogate is the
sole source of consent with respect to the clinical management of the pregnancy, including
termination of the pregnancy. Id. § 5(k).
177. Id. § 6.
178. Id. § 6(a).
179. Id. § 6(b).
180. Id. § 6(c).
181. UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION Acr §§ 2, 8, 98 U.L.A.
(Supp. 1994).
182. Alternative A comprises §§ 5-9 of the Act. Alternative B would simply make surro-
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The USCACA approval process is similar to that of the New
Hampshire and Virginia statutes. It requires the court to appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child, to hold a for-
mal hearing, and to ensure the satisfaction of ten criteria intended to
protect the interests of the parties. 18 5
Alternative A does not prohibit compensation to a surrogate or a
placement agency. It requires the intended parents to be a married
couple. 8 6 Alternative A also permits the surrogate to "change her
mind" within 180 days after the last insemination. 7
G. Surrogacy in Maryland
The current state of the law on surrogacy in Maryland is best de-
scribed as unclear. The state legislature has made numerous attempts
to prohibit surrogacy that have either not passed or have been vetoed
by the Governor.1 8 Two Maryland courts have taken sharply conflict-
ing positions on surrogacy.'89 "Family law experts worry ... that if a
collision-which may come in this year's General Assembly session-
fails to definitively pronounce a policy or produce a regulatory frame-
work for surrogate parenting, Maryland risks becoming the battle-
ground for the next 'Baby M' legal battle." 9 °
1. Legislative and Executive Activity.-In the wake of the Baby M
decision in 1988, Maryland legislators considered several potential
surrogacy laws. Many of the proposals would have prohibited surro-
gacy altogether. g' During the 1988 session, the General Assembly
185. Id. § 6. These criteria include a finding as to whether the intended mother is un-
able to bear a child, the completion of home-studies of the intended parents and the surro-
gate, a determination that the surrogate has had at least one pregnancy and delivery and is
medically fit for the pregnancy, and that all the parties have received counseling and medi-
cal evaluations including genetic screening. Id.
186. Id. § 1.
187. Id. § 7(b).
188. See infra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 208-225 and accompanying text.
190. Michael Riccardi, Family Law Experts Ponder Effects of Surrogacy Decision, THE DAiLY
REc. (Md.), Nov. 13, 1993, at 1.
191. The first Maryland Bill, Senate Bill 795, was introduced only two days after the Baby
M decision was handed down. Carol L. Nicolette & Libby C. Reamer, Comment, Regulatory
Options for Surrogate Arrangements in Mayland, 18 U. BALT. L. lv. 110, 136-37 (1988). That
bill would have banned surrogacy absolutely and imposed maximum criminal sanctions of
either a $10,000 fine, one year imprisonment, or both. S.B. 795, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess. The
bill was adopted by the Senate, but was subsequently defeated in the House Judiciary Com-
mittee. Nicolette & Reamer, supra, at 136. Later that month, a similar bill that would have
invalidated commercial surrogacy agreements and subjected violators to criminal sanctions
was proposed in the House of Delegates. H.B. 1479, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess. The bill did not
include sisters and sisters-in-law (i.e. intra-family, altruistic surrogacy) in the prohibition, so
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considered House Bill 649.192 House Bill 649 would have established
minimum protections for the parties involved in surrogacy agree-
ments and would have required that certain terms be included in an
enforceable contract. 1 93 This attempt to regulate surrogacy was de-
feated in the House Judiciary Committee.'
In 1992, the Maryland General Assembly passed a ban on surro-
gacy contracts.' 95 Senate Bill 251 stated simply that "[a] surrogate
parentage contract is void and unenforceable as against state pol-
icy." 19 6 Governor Schaefer, however, vetoed the Bill.'9 7 In his veto
statement, the Governor explained that the Maryland Attorney Gen-
eral's Office advised that a state court would probably hold a surro-
gate parentage contract unenforceable based on Maryland's criminal
prohibition on child-selling. 19 Governor Schaefer also based his veto
on the political reality that public opinion in Maryland was deeply di-
vided on surrogacy' 99 and on his own view that "the creation of a fam-
ily is a personal decision I think best left to the individuals
involved."20 0 Governor Schaefer recognized that "the vast majority of
surrogacy arrangements work without the necessity of litigation. "201
Despite the failed attempt at Senate Bill 251, Senator Norman
Stone, Jr. introduced an identical bill in 1993.212 This bill was even
long as these parties received only reasonable compensation for medical, prenatal, and
birth expenses. Id. This bill was defeated by a vote of 16-5 in the House Judiciary Commit-
tee. Nicolette & Reamer, supra, at 136 & n.182.
192. Nicolette & Reamer, supra note 191, at 137.
193. H.B. 649, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess. The bill included proposed amendments to the
Family Law, Estates and Trusts, and Health-General articles of the Maryland Annotated
Code. Nicolette & Reamer, supra note 191, at 137 & n.190. The proposal seemed to ad-
dress only genetic surrogacy but would have required that the surrogate be 18 years old
(although she need not be married) and that she undergo medical examinations and psy-
chological counseling. Id. The bill required disclosure of the results of the medical exami-
nation but made disclosure of the psychological evaluation optional upon request. Id.
Payment of compensation into an escrow account for the surrogate would be permitted if
made prior to the first attempt at insemination, but would have allowed the intended fa-
ther to recover any fees paid or expenses incurred if the surrogate voluntarily terminated
the pregnancy. Id.
194. Nicolette & Reamer, supra note 191, at 137 and nn.187-190.
195. S.B. 251, 1992 Md. Leg. Sess.
196. Id.
197. Letter from W. Donald Schaefer, Governor of Md., to Thomas V. "Mike" Miller, Jr.,
President of the Maryland State Senate (May 26, 1992) (outlining his rationale for vetoing
Senate Bill 251).
198. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-327 (1991)).
199. Id.
200. Id at 2.
201. Id. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
202. Barry F. Rosen & Lynn S. Lawson, Surrogacy Contracts in Transition, MD. BARJ.,July/
Aug. 1993, at 32, 35 (citing S.B. 369, 1993 Md. Laws).
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203less successful, passing the Senate but not the House. It also re-
ceived an unfavorable report from the House Judiciary Committee.20 4
2. Judicial Activity.-As of this writing, Maryland courts have ad-
dressed the legality of surrogacy twice.20 5 Both cases involved uncon-
tested adoption proceedings pursuant to genetic surrogacy
arrangements upon which each court granted a petition for adop-
tion.206 But, although both courts relied on the same Maryland law
which prohibits surrogate compensation in connection with an adop-
tion, they reached directly conflicting results on the legality of surro-
gacy. This brief judicial history, coupled with prior legislative failure,
illustrates the urgent need for comprehensive surrogacy legislation in
Maryland.20 7
In Ex Parte in the Matter of the Petition for the Adoption of a Minor
Child,20 8 Howard County Master Bernard Raum wrote that "surrogate
contracts which involve the custody of a child and for which payments
are made in connection therewith are governed by [the baby-selling
statute] and are therefore against public policy."2 9 The court con-
cluded that the contact was one of baby-selling and cited a provision
in the contract which provided that the surrogate would receive full
compensation [of $10,000] if the child was born premature and died
after seventy-two hours, but only partial fees if the child failed to sur-
vive for seventy-two hours after being born.210 The court further
stated that "any attorney who advise [d] their [sic] clients to contract
in this fashion would seem to be at the least accessories before the fact
and thus liable not only for prosecution as a principal but also for Bar
sanctions."211 Although the court admitted that the legislature was
the proper forum for addressing the propriety of surrogacy agree-
ments, and that "it is apparent that the public policy questions sur-
rounding surrogate agreements is [sic] in a state of turmoil," it held




205. See infra notes 208-223 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 208-223 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
208. Circuit Court for Howard County, Md., No. 91 AD 1681 (June 19, 1992).
209. Id. at 6.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 11.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
More recently, in a Montgomery County Circuit case,'21 Judge Pe-
terJ. Messitte took the opportunity to address the validity of surrogacy
agreements. 214 Pursuant to a 1992 statute,2t5 Judge Messitte reviewed
the propriety of all adoption-related expenses prior to the entry of a
final adoption decree. 216 The judge opined that surrogacy contracts
do not violate existing Maryland statutes prohibiting the payment of
compensation in connection with a placement for adoption 21 7 and
child-selling21 because it would be virtually impossible to prove that
the parties to a surrogacy contract had the criminal intent required by
these statutes.219
The court noted Governor Schaefer's letter vetoing Senate Bill
251220 and stated that "public opinion [in Maryland] was too divided
to permit the Court to declare such contracts violative of public policy
as a matter of law."22' The court cited the Governor to support the
proposition that surrogacy is "a legitimate activity, at least so long as
all parties are satisfied."222 Judge Messitte called for legislative action,
and stated that "it is clear to the Court that the prerogative to prohibit
or permit these arrangements belongs not to it, but to the General
Assembly." 22 ' Although the M.S.M. and G.M. Adoption decision does
not have precedential value, 224 it is "nonetheless likely to carry signifi-
cant weight whenever the matter is revisited," 221 in view of Messitte's
recognized authority on family law2 26 and his recent appointment to
the federal bench.
22 7
In light of Maryland's experience with surrogacy, it seems likely
that the General Assembly will take decisive action in the near fu-
213. Ex Parte M.S.M. and G.M. for Adoption of an Infant Minor, Adoption No. 11171,
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Md. (Aug. 20, 1993) [hereinafter M.S.M. and G.M.
Adoption Case].
214. Judge Messitte, like Master Raum, expressed his thoughts on the matter, despite
the fact that the adoption was uncontested. Id. at 1.
215. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-327 (1992 Supp.).
216. M.S.M. and G.M. Adoption Case, slip op. at 1.
217. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-327 (1992 Supp.) (providing that apart from legal
and medical fees, no additional compensation may be given to the natural mother in an
adoption proceeding).
218. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35(c) (1992) (proscribing the sale, trade, barter, or offer
to sell, trade, or barter a child for money or property).
219. M.S.M. and G.M. Adoption Case, slip op. at 8-9.
220. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
221. M.S.M. and G.M. Adoption Case, slip op. at 2.
222. Id. at 13.
223. Id. at 19.
224. Circuit court opinions, typically, are not subject to official publication.
225. Surrogate Parenting Agreement Upheld 10 MD. FAM. L.M. 1, 9 (Oct. 1993).
226. Id.
227. Riccardi, supra note 190, at 24.
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ture.22s The enactment of comprehensive legislation that fully regu-
lates surrogacy is a realistic and reasonably protective solution, as well
as a logical extension of Maryland's already progressive requirement
that insurance companies cover in vitro fertilization. 9 It is estimated
that "several hundred births" pursuant to surrogacy agreements have
occurred since surrogacy began in Maryland in the early 1980s. 23 0
Comprehensive legislation would provide much-needed practical gui-
dance in the face of a legal vacuum in which at least two private surro-
gacy agencies currently operate.23 '
V. RESPONDING To FEMINIST CRITICISM: PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND
OTHER REFORM
Legislation is needed in order to resolve the inconsistencies and
uncertainty created by this patchwork of judicial precedent and legis-
lative activity. Although regulatory legislation arguably legitimizes the
practice of surrogacy, it is necessary to protect more fully the interests
of the parties and to inject greater predictability into the process. The
solution proposed by this Comment would permit surrogacy contracts
but leave them unenforceable. The proposal seeks to avoid the crea-
tion of a false sense of security which might encourage people to enter
unwisely into these agreements and at the same time respond to the
reality that surrogacy will be practiced.
There is no doubt that some surrogacy arrangements have re-
sulted in painful disputes.232 Viable, comprehensive legislation would
substantially reduce this possibility, although it is inevitable that new
technology and the imponderables of human nature will continue to
present the occasional conundrum for the courts.233 Even in the face
of these emotionally charged controversies, we should strive to have a
228. Id. (' 'It is only a matter of time until one of these cases is going to blow up and a
judge will have to make a difficult decision .... This is the wrong way to make law. This
ought to be a legislative policy decision.'" (quoting Natalie H. Rees of Rees & Boyd, who
submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the surrogate in the M.S.M. and G.M. Adoption
Case)).
229. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 354DD (1991). See generally Riccardi, supra note 190, at
24, 27 (discussing surrogacy procedures that must be taken into account by future legisla-
tion). The mandated insurance coverage should begin to ameliorate the financial
problems that limit surrogacy to the upper and upper-middle classes.
230. Riccardi, supra note 190, at 27.
231. Nicolette & Reamer, supra note 191, at 125 n.97. These two centers are Infertility
Associates International, in Chevy Chase, and Surrogate Motherhood, Inc., in German-
town. Id. Both centers are for-profit organizations and use privately-developed screening
and testing procedures. Id.
232. See supra note 2.
233. See Riccardi, supra note 190, at 24.
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proactive surrogacy policy which is grounded in reason and realism,
not one which is simply reacting to images of babies being plucked
from their mothers' arms. The vast majority of surrogacy situations
never deteriorate into court battles,"3 4 and such a reactionary re-
sponse against surrogacy generally ignores its potential benefits.
"[T] he hurt and human sadness evident in the Baby M case should not
be used as a benchmark to judge all surrogacy arrangements. "235
A. Legislative Reform
1. Access to Surrogacy.-Surrogacy should not be available to
those who are able but unwilling to have children. It should be acces-
sible only to the infertile.23 6 This limitation would, in part, address
the concerns of those who fear the development of an underclass of
breeder women. 237 In an affirmative sense, "[i]t is important that sur-
rogacy be considered as one of many options for infertile couples
rather than a way for women to avoid the rigors of pregnancy by shift-
ing the burden onto another." 38
Surrogacy should be available to all who are unable to have their
own children. It should not be limited to heterosexual married
couples, for example, as many statutes currently provide.2 39 Not only
does this requirement discriminate against homosexuals, but it di-
verges from a reality in which the traditional nuclear family is now the
exception rather than the rule. A lesbian couple, for example, for
whom artificial insemination has been unsuccessful, should be eligible
for a surrogacy program. Allowing homosexuals and single persons
access to surrogacy would check the concern that surrogacy may be
used as a patriarchal instrument to assert domination over female
reproduction.240
In order to make surrogacy a more accessible option, some surro-
gacy services should be covered by insurance. Maryland already man-
dates some coverage for IVF services. 24' The establishment of a
234. "[W] bile 75% of biological mothers who give a child up for adoption later change
their minds, only around 1% of the surrogates have similar changes of heart." Similarly,
"[i]n the majority of cases the parties see the [surrogacy] arrangement as in their own best
interests." Gostin, supra note 6, at 7.
235. Id. at 7.
236. See Lieber, supra note 15, at 226.
237. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
238. Lieber, supra note 15, at 14.
239. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21 (1994) (mandating proof of marriage on
the part of intended parents).
240. See, e.g., CoaRA, supra note 29, at 273-74.
241. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 354DD (1991).
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feasible surrogacy option for women of modest economic means
would ameliorate surrogacy's potential to exploit lower classes and mi-
nority women.242 Many states currently have such legislation pending
or already on the books.24
2. Informed Consent. -Voluntary and informed surrogate con-
sent is possible. A comprehensive statute should facilitate informed
consent by using several methods, including counseling; full disclo-
sure of all physical, emotional, and financial risks; evaluation of the
likelihood of success of a given surrogacy method, including statistics
of its past success; independent legal and medical representation for
the parties; and judicial oversight of surrogacy contracts. 244
a. No Previous Birth Requirement.-Many legislators and com-
mentators argue that the surrogate should be required to have had a
previous live birth in order to ensure a sound basis to give truly in-
formed consent.245 Yet, a previous birth requirement
is at odds with the legal doctrine of informed consent. No-
where is it expected that one must have the experience first
before one can give informed judgment about whether to
agree to the experience. Such a requirement would pre-
clude people from ever giving informed consent to steriliza-
tions, abortions, sex change operations, heart surgery, and so
forth.24
6
To require surrogates to have had a previous birth is a difficult argu-
ment at best because it suggests a return to the sort of paternalism
feminists have been striving to eradicate.
[I] f people may be justifiably prohibited from acting in ways
that they may later regret, society would be justified in
prohibiting a variety of currently acceptable practices. For
example, both abortion and adoption procedures are vulner-
able to attack on these grounds. It is not at all clear that the
state can justify outlawing surrogacy, given the other prac-
tices it permits.... The claim that surrogacy contracts can-
not be considered voluntary because society itself refuses to
give women other options is reason to force society to give
242. See Lieber, supra note 15, at 211-16; see also CoREA, supra note 29, at 274-75.
243. See NCSL, supra note 110.
244. See Lieber, supra note 15, at 227-28 (if women fully understand the risks involved in
surrogacy, and have explored the reasons for entering into a contract, the risks of psycho-
logical harm will be minimized).
245. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
246. Andrews, supra note 7, at 172.
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women other options rather than reason to prohibit
surrogacy.247
Rather than requiring a previous birth, consent should be assured
through counseling, independent representation, and full disclosure
of all relevant information to the parties.
b. Disclosure. -Legislation should regulate and monitor the
way surrogacy clinics report their "success" rates. The irregularity of
reporting methods invites deception by clinics and can mislead surro-
gates and intended parents alike.2 41 "Clinics often measure success
rates not by the number of live births but by the number of successful
implantations that [may have] never result[ed] in births or even by
the number of chemical pregnancies (elevation of hormone level that
may but often does not result in an ongoing pregnancy)."249 Some
clinics count egg retrievals as measures of success rather than live
births.2"' Half of the clinics in a 1985 study by journalists Gena Corea
and Susan Ince had never had a single live birth.251 "Even some of the
IVF experts admit[ ] that, 'it's easy to fudge results. People can say
they have a 50 percent success rate and there's no way to check
that.' -252
Most clinics do not disclose the number of women who drop out
of the program, the number of infants that die within a month of
birth, or the percentage of pregnancies that end in miscarriages.253
In 1988, one of the country's largest fertility operations, IVF America,
was sanctioned by the Federal Trade Commission for claiming a
twenty-five percent success rate when in fact their true success rate was
closer to fifteen percent.25 4 Because of this widespread statistical ma-
nipulation, federal legislation is expected to take effect in the fall of
1995 which would require clinics to report their pregnancy success
rates according to uniform definitions, and would require either the
federal government or state governments to inspect and certify clin-
ics. 25 5 Regardless of whether the federal regulation is implemented,
247. Strasser, supra note 3, at 142.
248. See Elizabeth Royte, The Stork Market, LEAR's, Dec. 1993, at 52.
249. RAYMOND, supra note 3, at 10-11.
250. Royte, supra note 248, at 54.
251. RAYMOND, supra note 3, at 9-10.
252. Id. at 10 (quoting Alan De Cherney of Yale University).
253. Royte, supra note 248, at 54.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 88 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 (1994)). The legislation, however, does not
guarantee the safety or quality of medical care. Id.
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legislation at the state level should contain provisions to monitor clin-
ics and prohibit deceptive practices.
c. Counseling and Evaluation.-Legislation should mandate
medical evaluations, genetic testing, psychological evaluations, and
counseling of the prospective parties as part of its informed consent
protections.256 In the past, psychological counseling and screening of
prospective parties has been generally lacking or inadequate. In the
Baby M case, Mrs. Whitehead was examined and psychologically evalu-
ated, but the evaluation "was not put to any use."257 Although the
evaluation indicated that "Mrs. Whitehead demonstrated certain traits
that might make surrender of the child difficult and that there should
be further inquiry into this issue in connection with her surrogacy,....
neither Mrs. Whitehead nor the Sterns were ever told of this fact, a
fact that might have ended their surrogacy arrangement. " 258 In a like
manner, medical evaluations vary dramatically in scope and quality.259
Legislation should impose clear guidelines that specify the criteria for
evaluation and remove some diagnostic discretion from the health
care provider. 2
60
The evaluations of both the intended parent(s) and the surrogate
should include a home study as required in adoptions. 26' Home stud-
ies will protect the interests of the intended parents (and the fetus) by
the advance detection of potential problems with the surrogate such
as alcohol or drug abuse. Such a study is surely preferable to and
more effective than coercive contract clauses which presume to regu-
late the surrogate's behavior.262 An evaluation of the surrogate's abil-
256. Professor Karen Rothenberg has pointed out that "we do not know what the accept-
able psychological profile is for a low risk couple and surrogate." Karen H. Rothenberg,
Gestational Surrogacy and the Health Care Provider: Put Part of the "IVF Genie" Back Into the
Bottle, 18 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CAR 345, 348 (1990). Although there is no definitive
answer to this question, providers should at the least screen the surrogate for some fairly
high standard of mental well-being, complete comprehension of the contract, and ability
to care for the child should she change her mind, not simply for the ability to detach
herself psychologically from a fetus.
257. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1247 (1988).
258. Id. at 1247-48.
259. See, e.g., Mounce v. Hanson, No. 89-045388 (Harris City, Tex. 1990) (surrogate died
of heart failure during the eighth month of her pregnancy, her history of heart trouble was
never revealed during the screening process);Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)
(surrogate failed to disclose two miscarriages and two stillbirths).
260. See Rothenberg, supra note 256 (discussing the ethical and legal problems of the
gestational surrogacy process).
261. FILE, supra note 8, at 63.
262. Rothenberg, supra note 256, at 350; see Gostin, supra note 6, at 13-16 (noting that
various investigatory methods used in home study could pose threats to individual privacy
and autonomy).
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ity to provide and care for the child is necessary to cover the possibility
that she may become the custodial parent of the child in the event she
exercises her right to keep the child.
Home studies should examine "the ability and disposition of the
person being evaluated to give a child love, affection, and guidance,
... the ability of the person to adjust to and assume the inherent risks
of the contract, [and the] ability and disposition of the person to pro-
vide the child with food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and other
basic necessities."263 This does not mean health care providers or
counselors should seek out surrogates who are passionless or de-
tached. Rather, home studies should ensure that the parties will make
good parents and that they fully understand the risks involved. Adop-
tion style evaluations are often criticized as an unwarranted imposi-
tion of "middle-class values." 64 If the above criteria is as objective as
reasonably possible, the benefits of extensive evaluations should out-
weigh the doubtful risks of judging a party by conventional social
values.
d. Independent Representation.--Surrogacy legislation should
require independent medical and legal representation for all parties.
Such independent representation was absent in many of the surrogacy
arrangements that later degenerated into litigation.265 This require-
ment will diminish the potential for oppression of the surrogate and
facilitate truly informed consent by all parties.266
e. Surrogacy Contracts Must Be Pre-Approved.-Effective legisla-
tion should follow New Hampshire's model and recognize only pre-
approved surrogacy contracts. 267 Pre-approval adds another safe-
guard to ensure that the parties have given informed consent to the
surrogacy arrangement.211 Pre-approval is also desirable because it
permits reasonable compensation to the surrogate. Judges must be
263. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:18 (1994).
264. FIELD, supra note 8, at 63.
265. In Baby M, for example, "[t]he only legal advice [the surrogate] received regarding
the surrogacy contract was provided in connection with the contract that she previously
entered into with another couple. [Her] lawyer was referred to her by the [surrogacy
center], with which [the lawyer] had an agreement to act as counsel for surrogacy candi-
dates." In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988).
266. SeeJoan Mahoney, An Essay on Surrogacy and Feminist Thought, in SuRuoc, ATE MOTH-
ERHOOD, PoLITrcs AND PRIVACY 189 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
267. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23 (1994).
268. Virginia claims that "by recognizing both [pre-approved and non pre-approved]
contracts and making certain that they conform to a certain standard, [its] statute affords
persons entering into surrogacy arrangements more protection than the New Hampshire
statute does." Lieber, supra note 15, at 224. However, the Virginia statute actually affords
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able to disapprove coercive surrogacy arrangements that resemble
baby-selling.2 6
9
3. Payment to the Surrogate.-The prohibition of commercial sur-
rogacy, or payment to surrogates, would not minimize surrogacy's per-
ceived harm to society. First, to deny women payment for their labor
is a regression to the days when women were excluded from the labor
force. It is an unfair denial of the valuable service that a surrogate
provides as well as the risks she faced when she bears a child. "A
human being has the right to contract with another to be paid for the
performance of services, even highly personal services."270 To deny
surrogates compensation promotes the retrograde stereotype that wo-
men are selfless altruists and exacerbates the fiction that women are
indecisive, emotional creatures controlled and defined by their
biology.
Many judges, legislators, and commentators assert that if a wo-
man is motivated by love, surrogacy is perfectly acceptable, but if she is
motivated by money, it is not.2 1 Aside from the difficulty in discern-
ing individual motivations, it is dangerous for women to allow value
judgments about their motivations to determine the scope of their
rights. "Altruism has been one of the most effective blocks to wo-
men's self-awareness and demand for self-determination... [t]he so-
cial relations organized around norms of altruism and the giving of
self have been among the most powerful forces that bind women to
patriarchal roles and expectations."272 By limiting women to altruistic
surrogacy, society would play into the very stereotypes that have per-
formed an historical disservice to women.
Altruistic surrogacy, moreover, may be more dangerous. If the
situation deteriorates into conflict, it would become even more diffi-
cult and emotionally stressful where the surrogate and the intended
less protection to gestational surrogates who enter into non pre-approved contracts. See
supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text,
269. Nicolette & Reamer, supra note 191, at 141.
270. Gostin, supra note 6, at 9. Gostin argues that "[a ] woman's decision to sell her
intimate services may well constitute an indignity for all women and may well mean that
she is allowing herself to be exploited. Nonetheless, that choice is not for the state or the
body politic but for the woman alone to make." Id. at 10.
271. See FIELD, supra note 8, at 78; see also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(3) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (providing that contracts entered into for compensation are void as
against public policy); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1980) (declining to find
surrogacy contract void when surrogate voluntarily relinquishes the child, without pay-
ment, and is permitted the opportunity to change her mind and assert her parental
rights).
272. RAYMOND, supra note 3, at 51.
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mother, for example, are sisters or related in some other way. One
Maryland attorney pointedly discourages such intra-family arrange-
ments.273 She stated that although "[m]ost medical programs ... pre-
fer a family member [to act as a surrogate] .... I think it is a mistake
because the child and surrogate remain within the same extended
family. [A non-related surrogacy] prevents disruptions in the ex-
tended family."274 In a like manner, "the potential for women's ex-
ploitation is not necessarily less when no money is involved and
reproductive arrangements take place among family members." 271
Coercion within the context of the family may be even more onerous
than coercion by contract or money. "[W] here family integration is
strong, however, the nature of family opinion may be so engulfing
that, for all practical purposes, it exacts a reproductive donation from
a female source."2 7
6
If it is unacceptable to deny women compensation for surrogacy
services, the question becomes, "how much compensation?" On one
hand, not to regulate compensation is inappropriate because it will
likely lead to increased commercialization of the process. But, to al-
low unlimited compensation would make surrogacy even more inac-
cessible to the non-wealthy than it already is and exacerbate concerns
about surrogacy's exploitative potential.
Legislation should adopt a compensation scheme similar to the
ABA Model Surrogacy Act. The ABA Model calls for a three-person
panel to set lower and upper limits on the amount of compensa-
277 Motion. The Model Act specifies that "the maximum fee shall not be
more than 150% of the minimum fee."271 It also provides that the
range shall be reevaluated every two years.279
4. Content of the Contract.-
a. Surrogacy Contracts are Legal But Unenforceable.--Surrogacy
contracts should be legal but unenforceable, as they are in Virginia
and New Hampshire. 28 ° In practice, this means that the contract is
legal, but that the surrogate is permitted to change her mind after the
birth, much as the birth mother can in a standard adoption proceed-
ing. Although a surrogate's consent is more likely to be fully volun-
273. Riccardi, supra note 190, at 27.
274. Id. (quoting Natalie H. Rees of Rees & Boyd, Baltimore, Md.).
275. RAYMOND, supra note 3, at 53.
276. Id. at 54.
277. Model Surrogacy Act § 3 (proposed official draft 1988).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 139-170 and accompanying text.
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tary and informed than a birth mother's prenatal consent to an
281adoption, a waiting period is necessary to protect the surrogate's
interests and autonomy. A waiting period may also be compelled by
282civil liberties concerns.
The length of the "grace period" for revocation of the contract
should be of sufficient duration to allow the surrogate time for reflec-
tion, but not so long that it compromises the best interests of the in-
fant. The 180 days allocated by Virginia statute is too long, especially
because the first 180 days of a child's life is a crucial bonding period
for both parent and child.213 On the other hand, New Hampshire's
72 hour period is too brief.284 The surrogate could be asleep or other-
wise in recovery from labor and incapable of rational decision-making.
It would be appropriate in this instance to borrow from adoption law
and compromise at a fifteen day waiting period.285
b. All Clinical Decisions During Pregnancy are Made by the Surro-
gate.-Surrogacy legislation should disallow any clause in a surrogacy
contract that requires the surrogate to undergo any medical tests or
procedures during pregnancy, including abortion in specified circum-
stances. Indeed, it should require every surrogacy contract to contain
a provision which specifies that the surrogate is the sole source of all
clinical decisions regarding herself and the fetus. Basic notions of
civil liberties compel this result. "The rights to choose one's lifestyle
and medical treatment are among the most private aspects of human
life.... Since [sic] the government cannot reach into this intensely
private domain, it is difficult to envisage a private party having the
power to do so based upon a contractual obligation."2 8 6 Although this
provision tends to expose the interests of the intended parents, re-
strictive behavior clauses are probably unconstitutional, and in any
case almost impossible to enforce.28 7
281. Shultz, supra note 11, at 383.
282. See Gostin, supra note 6, at 16 (arguing that fundamental rights to parenting should
be inalienable).
283. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-161 (Michie Supp. 1994). An unapproved contract requires
the surrogate to wait at least 25 days. Id. § 20-162(A) (3).
284. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25 (1994).
285. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 5-324 (1991). Maryland prohibits the entry of
a final decree of adoption until at least 15 days after the birth of the child and grants the
natural parents the right to revoke consent at any time before the final decree or within 90
days of filing their consent, whichever comes first. Id. § 5-311 (c) (1).
286. Gostin, supra note 6, at 14.
287. See id. at 15.
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c. Genetic versus Gestational Surrogacy.-It is arguable whether
any surrogacy law should distinguish between genetic and gestational
surrogacy agreements. The contributions that these surrogates make
are different, the risks taken are different, and the societal implica-
tions may differ as well.2 8' Without further public debate, however,
exactly how they should be differentiated remains unclear. The ques-
tion is whether a genetic surrogate "deserves" more, less, or simply
different protection and rights than a gestational surrogate.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists takes
the position that "the genetic link between the commissioning par-
ent(s) and the resulting infant, while important, is less weighty than
the link between the surrogate mother and the fetus or infant that is
created through gestation and birth."289 The California court in John-
son v. Calvert,290 on the other hand, held that the gestational surrogate
had no rights toward the child, which gave the genetic contributors,
the intended parents in that case, full parental rights.29' Although the
Johnson court's approach did not sufficiently appreciate the gesta-
tional surrogate's contribution, the ACOG approach is not entirely
acceptable either. More public debate is needed to shed light on this
issue.
d. Presumption that Intended Parents Assume Custody and Paren-
tal Responsibility. -New legislation should establish a clear presump-
tion that, regardless of any physical or mental defect of the child, the
intended parents shall assume custody and full parental responsibility
for the child. Although this provision burdens interests of the in-
tended parents (the state cannot force any parent to care responsibly
for a child), the establishment of this presumption is in the best inter-
ests of the child.292 The alternative, as exemplified by a California
statute that permits the intended parents to force the surrogate to
assume custody and responsibility for the child if she was "responsi-
ble" for the defect, is very problematic. 29  Not only does the Califor-
nia statute overprotect the interests of the intended parents at the
expense of the surrogate and, perhaps, the child, but it also creates
288. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
289. ACOG PAMPHLET, supra note 19, at 2.
290. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
291. Id, at 782.
292. See Gostin, supra note 6, at 7 ("While the possibility of both parents disclaiming
responsibility for an imperfect child is an understandable concern, no data, again, are
available to support it. Many handicapped infants are abandoned, and it is not certain that
surrogacy arrangements would have any significant impact on the rate of abandonment.").
293. S. 1160, 1993 CAL. STAT. § 9518(9).
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great uncertainty and the opportunity for litigation. It is already diffi-
cult to determine the actual cause of many defects in a traditional
pregnancy. Surely, it will become too easy and unfair to blame the
surrogate for such problems.
B. Other Reform
Although legislation can be an effective means of addressing
many of the feminist criticisms of surrogacy, it is only part of the an-
swer. New perspectives on social action and medical responsibility
need to be formulated.
First and foremost, medicine should make the prevention of in-
fertility a public health priority.294 That we invest far less money and
effort in prevention than we do in the treatment of infertility is an
example of the reactive, rather than the proactive, approach to policy
that is endemic to American public health."9 The prevention of dis-
eases which cause infertility should be a priority.296 Our work places
need to become more "child-friendly" through the provision of on-
site, quality day-care, so that women are not forced to delay
childbearing. 29 7
Second, attitudes that define women (and men) through their
reproductive experience or lack thereof must be combatted.2 98 Popu-
lar assumptions that women are less valuable if they cannot have chil-
dren, or selfish if they choose not to have children, are still
294. See, e.g., Charo, supra note 41, at 107-08 (stating infertility may be reduced by more
research, data collection and education on sexually transmitted diseases; coordinating ca-
reer development and reproduction to allow couples to have children during peak fertility
years; and improving adoption procedures); Nadine Taub, Surrogaty: A Preferred Treatment
for Infertility?, in SuRRoGATE MOTHEMOOD: PoLrcas AND PRIVACY 221 (Larry Gostin ed.,
1990) (addressing causes of infertility and suggesting that society needs to change its think-
ing about fertility).
295. Other countries suffer from similarly short-sighted policies. For example, in 1985
the Australian government spent 25,000 Australian dollars on sexually transmitted disease
research and prevention, while financing one million dollars of IVF expenditures. RAY-
MOND, supra note 3, at 7.
296. Id.
The most commonly cited causes of female-factor infertility are blocked fallopian
tubes or tubal disease, pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) caused by, among other
things, past use of an IUD, past iatrogenic (doctor-induced) diseases such as ad-
hesions or occlusion resulting from gynecological surgery, C-sections, and abor-
tions, sexually transmitted diseases, ovulatory dysfunction, and endometriosis.
Id.
297. Charo, supra note 41, at 108 ("Congress could also help by facilitating the integra-
tion of employment, career development, and reproduction, so that couples might be bet-
ter able to have children during their peak fertility years.").
298. "The infertility business booms in a cultural context in which producing a child is
seen as a symbol of a marriage's success." Royte, supra note 248, at 54.
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widespread in our society.29 9 "As feminists have attacked the false es-
sentialism that the male sexual urge is uncontrollable and therefore
men need prostitutes to satisfy their sexual needs, so too feminists op-
pose the idea that reproduction is a biological imperative." ° °
Third, the manner in which surrogacy is carried out requires
close attention. The medical profession's obsession with the technol-
ogy of medicine that comes at the expense of focus on the individual
patients needs to be changed."0 ' Perhaps such a shift will be forced
upon the medical profession by increasing public frustration with doc-
tors and the perception of them as uncaring technocrats. Medical
schools, for example, could put greater emphasis on the "art" of
medicine, and do more to foster a "patient-centered" work ethic for
doctors.3 02
That technology is perceived by many doctors as more important
than the patient is heightened in the context of female reproduction,
which the medical profession has historically over-medicalized to the
detriment of many women.303 This harmful over-medicalization has
manifested itself in many ways, including the large number of unnec-
essary cesarean sections performed each year, the Dalkon Shield, and
silicon breast implants.
Because over-medicalization is not a problem unique to surro-
gacy, the prohibition of surrogacy as an answer begs the question. In-
stead, we should search for ways to put women in control of the
surrogacy process whenever possible. It is ironic that, while doctors
and researchers continue to characterize reproductive difficulty as a
technological problem-which therefore requires a professional elite
to solve it-there is yet no official board certification for a fertility
specialist.30 4 "Any doctor may hang out such a shingle, and by all re-
ports they are hanging them out at a fast clip. Between 1974 and
1988, membership in the American Fertility Society jumped from
3,600 to 10,300.305
299. RAYMOND, supra note 3, at xviii.
300. Id.
301. SHERWIN, supra note 27, at 153.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 151. For example, "for many decades surgeons were inclined to subject all
women with breast cancer to mutilating radical mastectomies even though there was no
scientific evidence to establish that this treatment resulted in increased survival rates." Id.
Doctors have recommended hysterectomies far more frequently than medical necessity
demands. Id. at 152.
304. RAYMOND, supra note 3, at xvi; see also Royte, supra note 248.
305. RAYMOND, supra note 3, at xvi.
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Fourth, the language of surrogacy should be re-examined and re-
vised. As Paul Lauritzen points out, terms such as "harvesting" of eggs
tend to depersonalize and objectify both the process and the partici-
pants.30 6 "Women are not present in the medical language, which
speaks only of 'maternal environments' and 'alternative reproductive
vehicles.'" 0 7 A change in terminology, coupled with a change in the
way medical processes are carried out, could have an empowering ef-
fect on the participants. This may improve the way surrogacy, parties
to surrogacy agreements, and medical fertility professionals are per-
ceived by the public.
CONCLUSION
Surrogacy is a technology that forces us to question our notions
of family, parenthood, sex, personal freedom, and privacy. It raises
complicated and difficult questions. The law should not shrink from
the challenge to address surrogacy and its implications. Although sur-
rogacy is an issue which ultimately may not be resolved to everyone's
satisfaction, carefully drafted legislation can minimize the potentially
exploitative aspects of surrogacy and protect an individual's ability to
choose it as a reproductive option.
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306. Lauritzen, supra note 50, at 42.
307. RAYMOND, supra note 3, at xv.
